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Task Force 116 Operation Game Warden |
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The craft and personnel that patrolled the rivers
Patrol Boats River
The significant strategic and economic importance of South Vietnams extensive inland waterways made
it clear from the beginning of the war that the Navy would be in the front rank of the
allied forces laced by 3,000 nautical miles of rivers, canals, and smaller streams. The
fertile Mekong Delta south of Saigon, where the largest segment of South Vietnams
population lived, constituted the countrys rice bowl. Northward along the coast to
the DMZ, sizable rivers stretched inland past vital population centers such as Hue.
Throughout the country the road and rail system was rudimentary while the waterways
provided ready access to the most important resources. The side that controlled the rivers
and canals controlled the Heart of South Vietnam.
River Patrol Force Dispositions River Division 51 Can Tho / Binh Thuy
The PBR was the ubiquitous workhorse of the River Patrol Force. They were manned by a crew of four bluejackets, equipped with a pathfinder surface radar, two radios, and commonly armed with two twin mounted .50 caliber machine guns forward, M-60 machine guns (or a grenade launcher) port and starboard amidships, and a .50 caliber aft. Mark I's, the initial version of the PBR, performed well in the river patrol operations but were plagued with continual fouling of the water-jet engines by weeds and other detritus. When going alongside Vietnamese sampans for inspection, the fragil fiberglass hulls of the PBR were often damaged. New Mark II's versions of the craft, first deployed to the delta in Dec 1966, brought improved Jacuzzi jet pumps, which reduced fouling and increased speed from 25 to 29 knots, and were equiped with more durable aluminum gunwales.
Beginning in early 1967, the Atlantic SEAL Team 2 provided another three platoons, two of which were stationed with the Game Warden units at Can Tho. These units launched SEAL Operations in the central delta area. Although focused primarily on the areas south and west of Saigon, the SEALs also mounted operations in the I and 11 Corps Tactical zones.
During 1968 there were three separate PACV's deployed by the Army. They deployed
to the Dong Tam area to work with the U.S. 9th Division.
Although able to move with great speed over shallow marshy areas, such as the Plain of Reeds, the PACVs proved to be too noisy
and too mechanically sophisticated for riverine warfare in South Vietnam. The three Navy PACV's were finally turned over to the
Coast Guard in San Francisco.
Game Warden operations got underway in early 1966. Naval leaders set out to secure the vital water passages through out
the Rung Sat and to establish patrols on the large Mekong Delta rivers. On these latter waterways, the Viet Cong transported arms
and supplies brought in from Cambodia, shifted guerrilla units, and taxed the population. The navy created two separate task groups
to direct operations in the respective areas.
On 26 March 1966 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese forces kicked off operation Jack-Stay, the wars first
major action in the Rung Sat. PBR units (including one cection from Tortuga), minesweeping boats from Nha Be, SEALs, and
helicopters operated together to sweep the area. At the end of the 12 day effort, the allies had killed or captured 69 of the
enemy, destroyed Viet Cong supply bases, training sites; and other logistical facilities; and at least for a time, restricted enemy
movement in the zone.
By the spring of 1967 the Rapid build up of allied forces in the Rung Sat area, the refinement of tactics, and improvement
of weapon systems began to reduce enemy effectiveness. During the year the Vietnamese Regional Force and the U.S. Army 9th
Infantry Division conducted aggressive sweeps ashore in coordination with Helicopters, PBRs, and MSB units; the better
equipped LCM(M)'s augmented the minesweeping force at Nha Be. SEAL's began sowing mines throughout enemy-held areas, and both PBR's
and MSB's added rapid fire, 40-millimeter grenade launchers to their armament from mid-1967 to mid 1968. The Viet Cong continued
to ambush shipping on the Long Tau with mines, 122 millimeter rockets, rocket propelled grenades, recoilless rifles, machine guns,
and small arms. Quick response by allied reaction forces, however, often cut short these assaults. Ship damage and personnel
casualties were relatively light. Other attacks never occurred because of PBR and SEAL patrols upsetting enemy plans, and the
MSB's and LCM(M)'s sweeping of mines. Consequently, the communists were unable to sever the vital lifeline to
Saigon, even when their forces were fighting for survival during TET and post-Tet battles of 1968.
Game Warden operations in the central reaches of the Mekong Delta began on 8 May 1966, when PBR section 511 of River
Division 51 at Can Tho patrolled a stretch of the Bassac River. Soon afterwards other units initiated surveillance of the upper
Mekong and the My Tho, Ham Luong, and Co Chien arms of the mighty river that emptied into the South China Sea.
In the two boat random patrols TF-116 sailors checked the cargo and identity papers of junks and sampans plying the
waterways, set up night ambushes at suspected enemy crossing points, supported the SEAL's with gunfire and transportation, and
enforced curfew restrictions in their sector, usually no more then 35 nautical miles from the base.
Game Warden operations in the central delta registered only modest success from 1966-1968. These events foreshadowed a
busy and dangerous year for Game Warden sailors who boarded over 40,000 vessels and inspected them for enemy personnel and
contraband. In the process, the River Patrol Force destroyed, damaged, or captured 2,000 Viet Cong craft and killed, wounded, or
captured over 1,400 of the enemy. The U.S. Navy suffered the loss of 39 officers and men killed, 366 wounded, and 9 missing in
Battle.
The Tet offensive of 1968 fully engaged Task Force 116. Because of the firepower and mobility the PBR's stiffened the
defense of the numerous delta cities and towns that were under siege by the enemy. The River patrol boat units were key elements
in the successful allied stands at My Tho, Ben Tre, Chau Doc, Tra Vinh, and Can Tho. The enemy prevailed only at Vinh Long,
where the Viet Cong overran the PBR base forcing the defenders to withdraw to the Garrett County (LST-786), despite this and a few
other temporary setbacks, TF-116 reestablished firm control of the major delta rivers by mid-year and helped cut short the Viet
Cong attack on Saigon.
Task Force Clearwater headquarters was established on Mobile Base II, a floating barge complex stationed first at Tan My and later at Cua
Viet. Because heavily armed North Vietnamese Army units were present in the region, COMNAVFORV strengthened the 20-boat PBR task
force with monitors, armored troop carriers, PACVs, landing craft, and minesweepers. Task Force Clearwater could also call on
helicopters, attack aircraft, artillery, naval gunfire, and ground troops support from other units in I corps region. Convoys
bristling with weaponry were required to maintain the line of communication with forward combat units. The naval forces carried
out equally vital minesweeping and patrolling operations. During 1968, Task Force Clearwaters support was crucial to the
successful defense of Khe Sanh, the recapture of Hue, and the defeat of the enemy offensive in I Corps.
For Task Force 116's contribution of PBR and other resources after the end of 1968, see the section on this site describing
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's
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